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D. R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. 63, 96 P.3d 1159 (Nev. 
2004)1 
 
CONTRACTS – UNCONSCIONABILITY – ARBITRATION CLAUSE 
 
Summary 
 
Appeal from a district court order denying a motion to compel arbitration. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
Affirmed.  A contractual arbitration provision is procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable when it is inconspicuous, one-sided, and fails to advise the homebuyer 
that upon signing, significant rights under Nevada law are waived.   
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Real estate developer D.R. Horton entered into home purchase agreements with 
Michael Green, John Velickoff, and Tracy Velickoff (hereinafter “Homebuyers”).  The 
purchase agreements contained a mandatory binding arbitration provision.2   
 
The two page agreement was printed in small font.  The front page contained the 
purchase price, financial information, and signature lines.  At the bottom, in capital and 
bold letters, a clause read3: 
 
PARAGRAPHS 10 THROUGH 27 CONSTITUTE A PART OF THIS CONTRACT 
 
 On the last page, among other thingS, there was a limited warranty clause and the 
arbitration provision.  The font size used on the last page was even smaller than that 
utilized on the front page of the agreement.  The arbitration provision read: 
 
11.  THIS CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO THE NEVADA ARBITRATION RULES 
GOVERNED UNDER NEVADA REVISED STATUTE CHAPTER 38 AND THE 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT. 
Buyer and Seller agree that any disputes or claims between the parties, whether arising from a tort, 
this Contract, any breach of this Contract or in any way related to this transaction, including but not 
limited to claims or disputes arising under the terms of the express limited warranty referenced in 
Paragraph 10 of this Contract, shall be settled by binding arbitration under the direction and 
procedures established by the American Arbitration Association “Construction Industry Arbitration 
Rules” except as specifically modified herein or dictated by applicable statutes including Nevada 
Revised Statute Chapter 38 and/or the Federal Arbitration Act.  If Buyer does not seek arbitration 
prior to initiating any legal action, Buyer agrees that Seller shall be entitled to liquidated damages in 
the amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00).  Any dispute arising from this Contract shall be 
submitted for determination to a board of three (3) arbitrators to be selected for each such 
controversy.  The decision of the arbitrators shall be in writing and signed by such arbitrators, or a 
majority of them, and shall be final and binding among the parties.  Each party shall bear the fees 
and expenses of counsel, witnesses, and employees of such party, and any other costs and expenses 
                                                 
1  By Hilary Barrett Muckleroy 
2  The homebuyers each signed separate contracts, although each contract contained an identical arbitration 
clause. 
3  For purposes of illustration, similar font size to that used in the contract has been duplicated here. 
 2
incurred for the benefit of such party.  All other fees and expenses shall be divided equally between 
Buyer and Seller. 
 
 Nothing other than the capitalized paragraph title drew attention to the arbitration 
provision. 
 
 Green testified that he only read the first page of the agreement, because the 
second page was “all fine print.”  Horton’s agent told Green it was a standard contract.  
The Velickoffs testified that they read both pages of the agreement, including the 
arbitration clause, but did not understand that the provision constituted a waiver of their 
right to a jury trial or affected their rights to a construction defect claim under NRS 
Chapter 40. 
 
 In 2000, Homebuyers notified Horton of their intent to bring construction defect 
claims and the matter continued to arbitration pursuant to NRS 40.680.  The mediator 
concluded that the mediation was unsuccessful because Horton proceeded in bad faith.   
 
 On September 14, 2001, Horton sought arbitration of the claims.  Homebuyers 
answered Horton’s demand for arbitration and requested punitive damages in addition to 
compensatory damages for the defects.  While the parties were disputing a list of 
potential arbitrators, Homebuyers filed suit in district court seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the arbitration provision was unenforceable. 
 
 After a hearing, the district court denied Horton’s motion to compel arbitration, 
ruling that the clause was adhesive and did not meet Nevada’s standards regarding jury 
trial waivers.4  The district court also held that the clause was procedurally and 
substantively unconscionable because it operated to waive the right to a jury trial without 
mentioning the right and failed to inform homebuyers of the costs associated with 
arbitration and the difference in arbitration fees and filing fees of suits foiled under 
Chapter 40. 
 
 The district court refused to enforce the arbitration clause on the grounds that 
absent these disclosures, a homebuyer could not give informed consent. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Under NRS 38.247(1)(a), a denial of a motion to compel arbitration is directly 
appealable.  The party seeking to enforce the clause bears the burden of demonstrating 
that the clause is valid.5   
 Contractual unconscionability involves mixed questions of law and fact.6  The 
trial court’s factual findings are accepted upon review is supported by substantial 
                                                 
4  The Supreme Court of Nevada noted that the district court erred in analyzing the clause as a waiver of a 
jury trial, as the clause contained no such provision and Nevada case law regarding the enforceability of a 
jury trial waiver is inapplicable to the enforceability of an arbitration clause. 
5  Obstetrics & Gynecologists v. Pepper, 101 Nev. 105, 108, 693 P.2d 1259, 1261 (1985). 
6  Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
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evidence.7  Application of a trial court’s factual findings to the issue of whether a 
contractual provision is unconscionable is a question of law subject to de novo review.8  
 
Unconscionability 
 
 There is a strong public policy favoring arbitration because arbitration avoids the 
higher costs and longer time periods of litigation.9  However, courts may invalidate 
unconscionable arbitration provisions.10  Generally, in order for a court to invalidate an 
arbitration provision, procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present.11  
However, when the procedural unconscionability is great, less evidence of substantive 
unconscionability is necessary.12   
 
When the party lacks a meaningful opportunity to agree to the clause terms either 
because of unequal bargaining power13 or because the clause and its effects are not easily 
ascertainable upon review of the contract, a clause is procedurally unconscionable.14  
This usually involves the use of fine print and complicated, incomplete, or misleading 
language which fails to inform a reasonable person of the contract’s consequences.15 
 
The district court found that the Homebuyers had unequal bargaining power and, 
therefore, the agreement was an adhesion contract.  The supreme court held that this 
determination was not supported by substantial evidence because the record showed that 
it was possible to negotiate for deletion of this provision. 
 
The district court also found that the agreement was procedurally deficient 
because failed to indicate that by agreeing to arbitration, the Homebuyers would give up 
substantial rights under Nevada law.  Additionally, the court found that the clause was in 
fine print, undistinguishable from other provisions, and its significance was downplayed.   
 
The supreme court agreed with the district court that the clause was difficult to 
read and that nothing drew attention to its presence.  Even the termite and drainage 
provisions were capitalized, yet the arbitration provision was not.   
 
The failure to highlight the arbitration provision, coupled with the representations 
of Horton’s agent that the agreements were standard contracts were key elements in the 
district court’s findings of procedural unconscionability.   
 
                                                 
7  Lovey v. Regence Blueshield of Idaho, 72 P.2d 877, 881 (Idaho 2003). 
8  Id. 
9  Burch v. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 438, 442, 49 P.3d 647, 650 (2002). 
10  Id. 
11  Id. 
12  Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare, 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000). 
13  As is the case in adhesion contracts. 
14  Id. at 443-44, 49 P.3d at 650; Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002). 
15  American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 249 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Further, even if the Homebuyers noticed and read the arbitration provision, they 
would not be put on notice that they were waiving important rights under Nevada law.  In 
addition to the right to a jury trial, Nevada law provides for the recovery of attorney’s 
fees and costs in a construction defect claim.   
 
Horton did not have a duty to explain in detail each and every consequence of the 
arbitration agreement.  However, to be enforceable, the arbitration clause must at least be 
conspicuous and clearly put a purchaser on notice that s/he is waiving important rights 
under Nevada law.  Therefore, the district court did not err in finding the arbitration 
clause unenforceable. 
 
Turning to the issue of substantive unconscionability, there were two provisions 
of the agreement implicating substantive unconscionability.  First, the $10,000 penalty 
for refusing to arbitrate.  Second, the requirement that each party pay equal shares of the 
cost of the arbitration. 
 
The Ninth Circuit has held that “[w]here an arbitration agreement is concerned, 
the agreement is unconscionable unless the arbitration remedy contains a ‘modicum of 
bilaterality.’”16 
 
Here, the arbitration provision was one-sided because it imposed a penalty on 
Homebuyers if they refused arbitration, but imposed no such requirement on Horton.  
While this one-sidedness is not overwhelming, it is sufficient to establish substantive 
unconscionability.  Therefore, the district court properly determined that the arbitration 
provision was substantively unconscionable. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A contractual arbitration provision is procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable when it is inconspicuous, one-sided, and fails to advise the homebuyer 
that upon signing, significant rights under Nevada law are waived. 
                                                 
16  Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003) (quoting Armendariz) 
(applying California law). 
